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‘Far example, same aianetary
madels give rise to Madigliani and
Miller’s theoremsfar open market
aperafinas. These theorems state
conditions under which aper mar-
ket activity has aa implications far
iaterest rates, ar anything else.
Far a discussian nf such theorems,
end their empirical relevance, see
Wallace 119811, Chamley rrd
Pulemarchakis (1 984), Sargent
11982, 19871, Sargent and Smith
11987) ar Smith (I 9941.
The issue in the literature discussed
in faotriate I is: Urder what condi-
tions wauld there be such chain-
rels? That litemture suggests that
these channels exist only ii palicy
is condacted in a way which is
intentionally redistdbntne.
lenn Hubbard’s paper considerswhat is
perhaps the most basic questnon in
monetary economics: How does mone-
tary policy “work”? It suggests that informa-
tional frictions affectingcapital markets create
additional mechanisms—beyond those of
conventional textbook models—through
which monetarypolicy operates. In particular,
Hubbard suggests that “realistic models of
financial constraints on firms’decisions imply
potentially significant effects of monetary
policy beyond those working through con-
ventional interest rate channels.” Now I
personally feel thatthere are a number of
serious issues about what these “conventional
interest rate channels” are,’ but that takes us
beyond the scope ofthe present paper So, for
the purpose ofdiscussion, let’s imagine that
we accept that there are such channels,1 and
consider how the presence of financial con-
straints impacts the scope for monetary policy
to have other effects.
As the previousquotation suggests, there
ought to exist models in which thereare infor-
mational (or other) frictions affecting firm
investment decisions, and in which there is
scope for monetary policy to operate. This
requires a model with—at a minimum—money
capital anda creditnnarket friction. Moreover,
I would argue that an interesting model for
analyzing the role ofmonetary (or other)
policies in an economy with a financial market
friction should be a general-equilibrium model,
since we would like to know the answers to
at least two questions: not only
(I) What can unonetary policy do?
but also,
(2) What shouldmonetary policy do? (That
is, what are the welfare implications of
alternative methods of conducting mon-
etary policy?)
While the Hubbard paper cites any
number of references on financial market
imperfections and their effects on firm invest-
ment behavior, to my knowledge none of the
papers he cites presents ageneral-equilibrium
model ofan economy with money capital and
a credit market friction, So, at this point, I
have the following questions:
• What are the models of financial con-
straints implying these magnified effects of
monetary policy (presuming, of course,
the need for general-equilibrium models)?
• What are the implications of these models
for the effects (and welfare consequences)
of various methods for conducting mone-
tary policy?
The Hubbard paper comes in two parts:
Its appendix contains a suggestive model of
asingle firm undertaking credit-financed
investment, subject to a moral hazard prob-
lem, along with aproposed list of empirical
implications derived from the literature that
the model represents. The text of the paper
presents a discussion of the empirical litera-
ture on how monetary policy does (orcan)
affect the investment behavior of individual
firms. To a large extent, Ivery much like
both the model of the paper and the discus-
sion of the empirical evidence. I do think,
however, there is a serious question about
how these two parts of the paper fit together.
Let me therefore add to my list of questions:
• If we do have general-equilibrium models
of capital accumulation in the presence of
money and financial market frictions, what
do these models imply about the conse-
quences ofvarious monetarypohcy actions?
• What is (or could be) the empirical
evidence on these implications?
• How does the empirical evidence discussed
in the Hubbard paper bear on them?
Before proceeding to a discussion of
these issues, let me say that I intend to focus
my discussion most where the Hubbard dis-
cussion focuses least—on the theoretical
aspects ofmonetary growth models with





informational frictions, In large part, this is
because Glenn is a pioneer in, and amajor
continuing contributor to, the empirical lit-
erature on these topics, andhis discussion of
this literature is thoughtful and easy to follow
Thus, while admitting Glenn may have
absolute advantage along both dimensions,
considerations of comparative advantage
suggest that I should primarily concentrate
on theoreticalissues,
TheHubbard paper identifies three
common implications of the models he has
in mind, and which he identifies with the
credit view:
I. “Uncollateralized external finance is more
costly than internal finance,
2.“The spread between the cost ofexternal
and internal funds varies negatively with
the level of the borrower’s internal funds.
3. “A reduction in internal funds reduces the
borrower’s spending, holding underlying
investment opportunities constant.”
While the discussion on these points is
somewhat vague, from my knowledge of the
literature I take these to bepartial equilibrium
results that apply to a particular borrower,
holding aggregate conditions fixed, What
monetary growth models exist, then, that
would deliver these as implications at the
level ofan individual firm?
To my knowledge, there is exactly one
such model—that ofBoyd and Smith (1994).
Letme sketch the main features of this model
and then describe its implications for thekinds
of issues that come up in the Hubbard dis-
cussion.
The Boyd and Smith model uses as its
basic framework theneoclassical growth model
of Diamond (1965), which allows for outside
assets in a general-equilibrium model ofcap-
ital accumulation. The Diamond model is a
two-period, overlapping-generations model
in which all agents supply one unit of labor
inelastically when young, earning thepre-
vailing real wage rate. These agentsare retired
when old, They save for old-age retirement
by accumulating either capital or money (or,
more generally outside assets).
Capital accumulation in the Diamond
model—as in most traditional monetary
growth modelstm—is a “black box”; one unit
of consumption foregone today becomes one
unit of capitalafter one period. And, again
as in traditional monetary growth models,
there is no role for banks or other financial
market institutions.
Boyd and Smith modify the Diamond
model to allow for two classes of agents in
eachgeneration. One class of agent has access
to a stochastic linear technology for converting
current goods into future capital, the other
type does not. In all other respects, the two
types are identical.
The capital production technology
considered by Boyd and Smith is subject to
a standard costly state verification (CSV)
problem ofthe type considered by Townsend
(1979) and, more specifically Gale and
Hellwig (1985), Williamson (1986. 1987)
and Bernanke and Gertler (1989), As is con-
ventional in suchmodels, each operator of the
capital production technology must produce
at some fixed, indivisible scale. Thus, to
finance capital investments, young investors
must combine their own young period income,
along with funds obtained externally
Under the assumption ofrisk-neutral
firms and fixed verification costs, this setup
yields an optimal capital structure and
financing arrangement for firms producing
capital goods. Such firms should be (com-
pletely) debt-financed, andit is efficient for
them to borrow from financial intermedi-
aries. Presumably this captures the notion
of “bank-dependent borrowers” discussed
by Hubbard. Moreover, this model would
produce, at the individual firm level, the
three key results ofmodels that Hubbard
associateswith the credit view.
In this model, the amount of internal
finance provided by investors is endogenous,
depending on the young period wage income
of borrowers. Internal finance is valuable
because it helps to mitigate the CSV problem.
In addition, as in Galeand Hellwig (1985)
andWilliamson (1986, 1987), the presence
of the CSV problem permits credit rationing
to be observed for exactly the reasons dis-
cussed by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981): Because
of the costs of verifying project returns when
borrowers default, raising the interest rate
charged on loans affects a lender’s expected
return in anon-monotonic fashion. Thus,
See, far instarce, the models al
Sidmaski (1961 a,h), tmck
119/4) arTirole 119851.
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Natice than this does not require the
existence of ary reminal tigidites,
as Hubbard asserts.
the interest rate charged on loans can be “bid
up” to a level that maximizes the expected
return to a lender; thereafter, increases in the
interest rate reducea lender’s expected return
and are counterproductive. Asaresult, if the
demand for credit exceeds its supply and
interest rates are raisedto their expectedreturn
maximizing level, there is no action that an
unfunded (or rationed) borrower can take to
obtain a loan, This presumably maximizes
the scope for monetary factors to “matter,”
since availability ofcredit becomes an issue
of central concern.
Boyd and Smith consider the situation
where credit is rationed, and examine the
following policy regime. Themonetary
authority fixes, once and for all, a rate of
money growth. In the Diamond model, the
fixed rate of money growth determines the
steady-state real rate ofinterest. This formu-
lation givesthe Hubbard analysis its best case
scenario, parenthetically since it allows the
monetary authority—atleast potentially—the
power to control real interest rates directly4
The Boyd and Smith modification of the
Diamond model is, superficially, very minor.
Butit has dramatic implications for theprop-
erties of monetary equilibria in the Diamond
model. Mostof theseimphcations are, Ithink,
bad news from the standpoint of the kind of
analysis conducted in the Hubbard paper,
although there is one piece of good news. I will
now review some ofthe relevant implications.
THE BAD NEWS
Traditional monetary growth models
have the property that there is a unique
monetary steady-state equilibrium, which is
a saddle, Thus, one can unambiguously
identify the monetary equilibrium of such a
model, and can unambiguously discuss the
effects ofmonetary pohcy actions on the
equilibrium. The kind ofmodel that Hubbard
apparently has in mind may however, have
multiple equilibria, and multiple possible
effects ofa monetary policy action.
The Boyd and Smith model has (typically)
two monetary steady state equilibria. It can
easily transpire that one is a sink andone is
a saddle, so both can be approached. Thus,
there isa continuum of monetary equilibria.
The effects of a monetary policy action
depend—very strongly as it turns out—on
which equilibrium path the economy is fol-
lowing. Moreover, for some parameter con-
figurations there exist equilibria which
approach no steady state; that is, limit cycles
can be observed. Changes in monetary policy
can change the entire setof equilibria, creating
scope for equilibria that did not exist under
other configurations of policy
These possibilities are of some interest
from a theoretical perspective. They imply
that the interaction ofpolicy choices with
the operation of financial markets subject to
frictions creates a scope for the indeterminacy
of equihbrium and for “excessive fluctuations,”
apoint emphasized by Simons (1948) and
Friedman (1960). However, they also imply
that there is no unique answer to the ques-
tion: How do credit channels affect the
consequences ofmonetary pohcy?
Why do credit market frictions create
indeterminacies and renderquestions about
their effects on policy actions problematic?
Theanswer has to do with exactly the feature
most emphasized by Hubbard: the impor-
tance of internal finance, and the fact that
the abihty to provide internal finance is going
to be (at least partly) endogenous ina general
equilibrium model, In the Boyd-Smith model,
the monetary authority controls the real rate
of interest (at least in steady-state equilibria).
Borrowers are then forced to dehver this policy-
determined real rate ofreturn on funds they
obtain. In a steady-state equilibrium, there
are typically two ways to do this. One is to
have a low capital stock, a correspondingly
high marginal product ofcapital, and low
incomes (low levels of internal finance). The
other is to have a high capital stock, acorre-
spondingly low marginal product of capital,
andhigh incomes enabling borrowers to pro-
vide a lot ofinternal finance. Sinceinternal
finance mitigates the CSV problem, it offsets
the low marginal product of capital and per-
mits borrowers to offer lenders the necessary
expected return.
The keyelement in this analysis, of course,
is the endogeneity ofthe amount ofinternal
finance, Once this is endogenous, models
representing what Hubbard calls the credit
view cannot generally be expected to deliver
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unique equilibria, and questions about
“the effects” ofmonetary policy willnot
be well-posed.
To underscore this point, a monetary
expansion in the Boydand Smithmodel (a
higher rate of money growth) increases the
capital stock, output, and credit extension
in the low-capital-stock steady state. All of
these effects are reversed in the high-capital-
stock steady state.
(3 ~3
The good news is that—in the low-capi-
tal-stock steady state, where expansionary
monetary policy actions are actually expan-
sionary—the Boyd and Smith model predicts
that capitalmarket imperfections will enhance
the effects of agiven changein monetary
policy In particular, agiven change in the
rate of money growth hasalarger effect on
output in the presence of the credit market
friction than is the case under full informa-
tion. In this sense, one prediction of the
creditview is borne out.
However, even this effect does not occur
for the reasons discussed by Hubbard.
According to hisanalysis,
“the crux of models of information-
related financial frictions is a gap
between the cost of externaland internal
finance for manyborrowers. In this
context, the credit view offers channels
through which monetary policy can
affect this gap.”
In the Boydand Smith model, monetary
policy can have heightened effects, but not
because it affects the differential between the
costof internal and external funds in this way
Indeed, it is possible to show that, in the steady
state equilibria they examine, monetary policy
cannot affect this difi’erential (appropriately
defined). Nonetheless, in one of their steady
state equilibria, credit market frictions do
magnify the impact of monetary policy
y~aflthytsye’g&y ~ ~
Since the credit view applied to monetary
models seems prone to delivering multiple
equilibria, any discussion of its empirical
implications must confront the difficulties
associated with the empirical analysis of
models displaying multiple equilibria. This
is adifficult issue, and one that Iam not cur-
rently prepared to take on. However, Hubbard
argues that the money and the credit views
have the following implications:
“When informational imperfections are
ignored, an increase in real interest rates
following a monetary contraction should
affect investment (broadly defined) simi-
larly for borrowers ofa given type (for
example, with similar technology and
risk characteristics).5
“If informational imperfections aresignif-
icant only on the borrowerside, all else
equal, spending by borrowers with lower
levels ofinternal net worth should fall
relative to spending by borrowers with
higher levels of net worth.6
“The model’s intuition can apply to
banks as well as non-financial borrow-
ers. A decline in banks’ net worthraises
banks’ opportunity cost of external funds
(say in the CD market). As a result, the
cost of funds to bank-dependent bor-
rowers rises.”
I am not sure what the practical empirical
content ofthe first implication is likely to be,
since we do not typically observe the techno-
logical characteristics or demand conditions
of individual firms directly I am also unclear
as to why borrowers with similar net worth
cannot be affected differentially by monetary
policy under the creditview (This is, in fact,
what happens in the Boyd and Smith model.)
And, indeed, it is easy to produce certain
kinds of counter-examples to the second
claim in models that seemperfectly consis-
tent with the credit view,’ Finally credit-
view models, like Williamson’s (1987), tell
us that the effects of increases in the costs of
external funds candepend very heavily on
the nature ofhow interest rates are determined.
In particular, the “incidence” ofhigher costs
depends heavily on whether credit is rationed,
on the interest elasticity ofthe supply and
the demand for funds, and so on. It is there-
fore not clear to me why it follows that an
This implication applies, of coarse,
to the money view.
£ Ibis implication applies under the
credit view.
‘Far example, the layd and Smith
madel car easily be madfied to
allaw far barrawers with different
lenels at networth. In that model,
increases in interest rates will affect
only the spending nf marginal bar-
rawers (mba, in many data sets,
would then disappear from the
sample). Changes in interest rates
woald rot affect infra-ariarginal bar-
rawers. Ibis paint isilbistareel, far
enample, in themodel af Ma and
Smith (19931.
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increase in the costs of external funds for
banks must be borne by borrowers.
In short, it is not transparent that there
exist any sharp empirical hypotheses distin-
guishing the money view from the credit view
at the firm level. Perhaps we are best advised
to takeseriously thenotion that the credit view
predicts the possibility ofmultiple equilibria,
with some equilibria displaying endogenously
enhanced volatilityand to pursue the empirical
implications of that idea.
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